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Abstract— It is critical to secure the Industrial Internet of 
Things (IIoT) devices because of potentially devastating 
consequences in case of an attack. Machine learning and big 
data analytics are the two powerful leverages for analyzing and 
securing the Internet of Things (IoT) technology. By extension, 
these techniques can help improve the security of the IIoT 
systems as well. In this paper, we first present common IIoT 
protocols and their associated vulnerabilities. Then, we run a 
cyber-vulnerability assessment and discuss the utilization of 
machine learning in countering these susceptibilities. Following 
that, a literature review of the available intrusion detection 
solutions using machine learning models is presented. Finally, 
we discuss our case study, which includes details of a real-world 
testbed that we have built to conduct cyber-attacks and to 
design an intrusion detection system (IDS). We deploy 
backdoor, command injection, and Structured Query 
Language (SQL) injection attacks against the system and 
demonstrate how a machine learning based anomaly detection 
system can perform well in detecting these attacks. We have 
evaluated the performance through representative metrics to 
have a fair point of view on the effectiveness of the methods. 
 
Index Terms— Industrial Internet of Things, Machine 
Learning, Network Security, Intrusion Detection, Supervisory 
Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA), Cyber Attack, 
Vulnerability Assessment 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The primary concept of the Industrial Internet of Things 
(IIoT) is to take advantage of IoT technology in the 
industrial control system (ICSs). ICSs are an integral part of 
critical infrastructures and have been utilized for a long time 
to supervise industrial machines and processes. They 
perform real-time monitoring and interacting with the 
devices, real-time collection and analysis of the data, and 
also logging of all the events that happen in the industrial 
systems. Utilizing IoT technology in these systems enhances 
the network intelligence and security in the optimization and 
automation of industrial processes. 
The supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) 
system is the largest subset of an ICS. It provides a graphical 
user interface (GUI) through its human-machine interface 
(HMI). The HMI makes it easy for the operators to observe 
the status of the system, interact with the IIoT devices, and 
receive alarms indicating abnormal behaviors. A general 
scheme of SCADA systems is shown in Figure 1. As shown 
in this figure, these systems consist of four different sub-
systems; I/O network, supervisory control, control network, 
and corporate network. I/O network consists of the deployed 
IIoT devices (including sensors and actuators) in the 
industrial process. Supervisory control is the main sub-
system responsible for securing, controlling, and monitoring 
the IIoT devices. The control network includes 
programmable logic controllers (PLCs) that directly sense 
and manage the physical processes. Since the sensors and 
actuators cannot communicate directly, PLCs are used to 
collect the sensed data and send commands to the actuators. 
Finally, the corporate network consists of servers, 
computers, and other users connected to the network for 
other general services such as file transfer, website hosting, 
mail servers, resource planning, etc. 
 
Figure 1. SCADA Architecture 
ICSs are mostly mission-critical systems with high-
availability requirements. Their continuous operations lead 
to producing a huge amount of data that can be managed 
through big data analytics. In the past, these systems were 
standalone and isolated from the world, making them 
unsusceptible to external malicious attacks. Recently, 
increased connectivity of ICS with corporate networks and 
utilization of Internet communications to transmit the 
information more conveniently have rendered these systems 
vulnerable to malicious attacks. Due to the sensitive nature 
of many industrial applications, security has become the 
primary concern in SCADA systems. More specifically, lack 
of security considerations in their communication protocols 
directly compromises the availability, safety, and reliability 
of these systems. Our work in this area shows that machine 
learning based solutions can introduce new countermeasures 
to secure these systems. 
The main contributions of this paper are as follows: 
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• Describing the four most popular IIoT protocols, along 
with their main communication network vulnerabilities 
(Section II). 
• Conducting a vulnerability assessment of IIoT systems, 
identifying common malicious threats, analyzing the 
severity of the associated risks, and also studying the 
applicability of machine learning techniques to counter 
these threats (Section III). This is an essential step to 
prioritize required mitigations. 
• Reviewing the research papers that have designed 
efficient machine learning based intrusion detection 
systems (IDSs) for SCADA systems (Section IV). 
• Presenting our own case study, elaborating on the 
testbed designed at Washington University in St. Louis, 
to perform real-world SCADA operations, carrying out 
attacks (that have not been implemented either for the 
under-study or any other IIoT system by other 
researchers) against the system, and applying machine 
learning based IDS to tackle the intrusion detection 
problem, studying the most important features in 
identifying the attack traffic from normal (Section V). 
II. IIOT COMMUNICATION PROTOCOLS 
There are several IIoT data transmission protocols used in 
the SCADA systems. However, most of these protocols have 
been designed without accounting for cyber risks or security 
mechanisms to counter them. The legacy of SCADA started 
with Modbus communication protocol which is still the most 
widely employed protocol in these systems. Recently, there 
has been a trend in moving towards newer protocols such as 
Building Automation and Control Network (BACnet), 
Distributed Network Protocol version 3 (DNP3) and 
Message Queuing Telemetry Transport (MQTT). All four 
are open protocols. Modbus was developed as a SCADA-
vendor specific protocol in 1979 [1]. BACnet and DNP3 are 
standard protocols that were published in 1995 and 1993, 
respectively [2]. MQTT was developed in 1999 [3]. 
In this section, we study these four popular SCADA 
communication protocols along with their main security 
vulnerabilities. Since the main focus of this paper is on the 
network susceptibilities of the IIoT, this section has been 
included to show where each communication protocol is 
most vulnerable. 
A. Modbus 
Modbus is one of the earliest and the most commonly 
used protocol in the SCADA systems. The communication is 
serial and based on master-slave configuration. Master (e.g., 
HMI) is the device requesting the information and slave 
(e.g., PLC) is the one supplying the information. The master 
can also write data on the slave’s memory registers. In a 
standard Modbus communication network, there is one 
master that can have up to 247 slaves, each with a unique 
identification code (ID). There are four tables stored in the 
slave device, two for storing digital data and two for 
numerical analog data. 
Modbus does not provide confidentiality, authentication 
or integrity. Because all Modbus traffic is communicated in 
clear text (no encryption is provided), it lacks 
confidentiality, and the content of the packets can be easily 
seen using a sniffer tool. Modbus does not provide any 
public/private key management, which leads to lack of 
authentication as well. Also, there is no sufficient security 
check mechanism on the traffic, which makes it easy for the 
attacker to compromise the integrity of the data. Moreover, a 
flooding attack can interrupt the operation of the system and 
limit its availability. 
B. BACnet 
BACnet was primarily designed for building automation 
and control systems. This standard is currently under 
ASHRAE Standing Standard Project Committee (SSPC) 
135. BACnet, like most of the other industrial 
communication protocols, was not designed with security 
considerations. 
This standard provides several communication options, 
such as Ethernet, token-passing, master-slave, or point-to-
point connections [4]. In SCADA, it is more common to use 
the master-slave mode of BACnet. 
Due to lack of proper mechanisms for data confidentiality, 
reconnaissance attack is feasible. This protocol does not 
provide authentication procedures either. A few 
cryptography mechanisms, e.g., DES (Data Encryption 
Standard) and AES (Advanced Encryption Standard), have 
been included in the new versions of the BACnet standard. 
However, they are almost never utilized in industrial systems 
to maintain compatibility with the existing devices. Even in 
new green-field installations and in general, implementing 
encryption adds communication delays and large overheads 
in the system. The scan cycle times of PLC and HMI are 
usually on the order of milliseconds, and it is not yet feasible 
to accommodate data encryption in the system since 
encryption and decryption require a longer time process. In 
addition, denial of service (DoS) attacks can be conducted to 
target the system availability and halt the service [5]. 
C. DNP3 
DNP3 is another standard network protocol used in 
SCADA systems. It was originally designed to be very 
reliable, but it does not provide sufficient security 
mechanisms. As a result, most of the DNP3 devices lack 
authentication, encryption, and access control. DNP3 covers 
the four OSI layers: network layers, application layer, data 
link layer, and physical layer. The communication can 
happen in point-to-point mode but mostly happens in 
master-slave configurations, and it can include multiple 
slaves and multiple masters. 
No message authentication is deployed in this protocol, 
and hence data integrity is at risk. Eavesdropping and 
spoofing are easy as there is no encryption and the data is 
sent in clear text. DoS attacks can also easily impact the 
system’s operation [6]. The latest version of this protocol 
that was published by IEEE in 2012, provides secure 
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authentication, using IEC 60870-5 standard [7]. Through this 
standard, which has been developed for control systems, the 
authentication is provided using digital signatures. However, 
utilizing public key infrastructure (PKI) in IIoT devices is 
not feasible yet. The complexity that PKI adds cannot be 
handled by the simple IoT devices. Further, exchanging the 
keys, updating the keys, issuing or revoking certificates and 
other complexities that come with using PKI will add a huge 
delay in the system’s performance. 
D. MQTT 
MQTT is an open standard under OASIS and is based on 
publish/subscribe configuration. This network protocol has 
been very popular in the IoT domain because MQTT 
messages are very simple and lightweight. Recently, MQTT 
has been increasingly adopted in the ICSs due to its 
suitability for remote sensing and control. 
MQTT’s topology consists of clients and brokers. At any 
particular time, each client can be either a publisher or a 
subscriber based on whether they are requesting or 
supplying data. A broker is an intermediate device between 
the publishers and the subscribers to filter out the published 
data and send them to their subscribers. Each broker can 
handle thousands of clients, which helps the system with 
scalability. 
No encryption method has been implemented in MQTT, 
but TLS/SSL (Transport Layer Security/ Secure Sockets 
Layer) can be applied on the underlying TCP/IP 
(Transmission Control Protocol/ Internet Protocol) to 
provide an encrypted pipeline for the MQTT messages. 
However, since this requires a high level of complexity on 
the clients, it is not practical to use in the IIoT devices. 
Another main security drawback of the MQTT that 
originates from its topology is that, if an intruder steals the 
identity of a client, it will have access to all other clients’ 
data, and not only that specific victimized client. On the 
other hand, the broker can be designed to ask each client for 
their username and password to allow them to join the 
network. However, these credentials will be transmitted in 
clear text, if no form of encryption is utilized. For data 
integrity, MQTT can provide MAC (message authentication 
code) techniques such as HMAC (hash-based MAC) to 
ensure the received data hasn’t been tampered. HMAC is a 
lightweight cryptographic hash function. However, all 
clients who are aware of the secret key can sign or verify the 
data with the hash [8]. 
III. PREVALENT NETWORK VULNERABILITIES AND 
CYBER THREATS 
In this section, the nine most prevalent attacks in SCADA 
IIoT systems and the associated risks are studied. It should 
be noted that due to their fundamentally different nature, the 
prevalent vulnerabilities and security priorities in ICSs are 
different from the ones in traditional IT systems. Since there 
has been an extensive discussion on these differences, and 
this matter is beyond the scope of this paper, we refer the 
readers to the references [9] and [10]. 
The CIA triad (Confidentiality, Integrity, and 
Availability) are the security traits that must be preserved in 
any system to keep the data safe. Further, the AAA security 
controls (Authentication, Authorization, and Accountability) 
are the security tools to protect the CIA traits in the system. 
In this section, we study the most prevalent attacks targeting 
each of these security elements. Accountability has been left 
out since it is generally an administrative aspect. 
Our extensive study of relevant works (such as [9], [11], 
[12], [13], and [14]) reveals that these are the most common 
threats in the SCADA systems. However, unlike the existing 
works, in this paper, we 
• provide a comprehensive set of prevalent attacks, 
• define each attack separately regarding which 
security aspect they compromise, 
• explain how they impact the IIoT performance, 
• run a risk assessment based on the damage severity 
and the likelihood of happening in these specific 
systems, and 
• study the effectiveness of machine learning (ML) 
based security solution to encounter each class of 
attack. 
A. Prevalent Attacks 
The attacks are divided into five classes, based on which 
security aspects (integrity, availability, confidentiality, 
authentication, and authorization) are compromised. 
However, it is nearly impossible to define a solitary 
classification because the classes in which these attacks fall 
are not mutually exclusive. Often, compromising one aspect 
leads to compromising others as well. 
1) Integrity 
1.a) Buffer Overflow 
In buffer overflow attacks, the intruder tries to write large 
data (more than the designated size) in the buffer, causing 
the extra bits to overflow and overwrite other buffers and 
alter their values. This attack is usually caused due to poor 
input type or size validation mechanisms and makes the 
system unreliable or even crash. 
Buffer overflow attacks are highly prevalent in SCADA 
systems due to two main reasons. First, the majority of the 
operating systems in ICSs are written in programming 
languages such as C, which lacks type safety mechanisms. 
Further, SCADA devices operate continuously. The 
operating systems that have not been rebooted for years are 
more vulnerable due to accumulated memory fragmentation. 
The buffer overflow problem in SCADA systems can 
affect both the supervisory control and field devices such as 
sensors. PLC’s instructions to the output elements (e.g., 
turning on or off the water pumps) and sensed data (e.g., 
water level) could be manipulated through this attack [10]. 
1.b) Code Injection 
In a code injection attack, the intruder tries to execute 
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malicious commands or inject malicious data into the 
system. For instance, in a SQL injection attack, SQL queries 
are sent to control or compromise the database server. This 
attack exploits the system vulnerability due to the lack of 
user-supplied input data validation techniques. 
This attack enables the intruder to access sensitive 
information such as usernames and passwords, and also alter 
the data (e.g., allowing access to an unauthorized user, 
deleting the data, etc.). A command injection attack can 
manipulate the control commands in the system and disrupt 
the normal operation. 
Since the primary function of the SCADA systems is 
collecting and storing information, this attack may have a 
serious impact on the system. More specifically, if the 
system is controlled remotely through a web interface, this 
attack is able to compromise the data and the authentication 
procedures. 
1.c) Improper Input Validation 
This vulnerability is associated with the lack of proper 
mechanisms to validate the user’s input. This is a more 
general type of vulnerability, which could lead to other types 
of risks. The attacker may be able to enter wrong values that 
can make the system unstable. Moreover, since these 
systems are not checked regularly due to their deterministic 
nature, this attack might stay undetected for a long time [12]. 
2) Availability 
2.a) Denial of Service (DoS) 
An intruder carries out a DoS attack to flood the targeted 
computer (e.g., PLC and HMI). This attack disrupts the 
availability of the SCADA system by sending a large 
number of random packets to the target node at a high rate to 
make the target unresponsive and may even crash the whole 
system. 
A DoS attack against a SCADA system is generally 
carried out by an intruder connected to the network using 
SYN or HTTP flooding against a host. SYN attacks are 
constant fake synchronize requests, and HTTP attacks are 
either GET or POST requests to keep the web server of the 
target busy and not be able to respond to the normal traffic. 
If the links in the network are congested, monitoring and 
controlling the ICS will be highly difficult, if not impossible. 
Therefore, the main goal of the DoS attack is to hurt the 
system’s availability, so that legitimate users are not able to 
access the resources. 
3) Confidentiality  
3.a) Reconnaissance 
In a reconnaissance attack, the intruder engages with the 
SCADA network to gather information about the system, 
such as the connected devices, security policies, IP 
addresses, host information, etc. After identifying the 
elements of the network, the attacker maps the network 
architecture to identify the vulnerabilities in the system. 
Eventually, the attacker may use this information to run 
exploits against susceptible devices to interrupt the system’s 
functionality. 
Intruders may start this attack using sniffers. They 
eavesdrop and inspect the ongoing network traffic to gain 
information about the network elements and their status. 
Stealth scan in SCADA network can occur on the link 
between any of the two nodes of the network; for instance, 
the link between the I/O network and the PLC or the link 
between the HMI computer and the PLC. This attack is 
considered passive since the attackers are silent and do not 
inject any traffic that would expose them. Although this 
attack may not be considered severe, the network 
information is exposed to an unauthorized person, and it is 
very difficult to detect. 
4) Authentication 
4.a) Unauthenticated Access 
This vulnerability is due to poor authentication 
mechanisms in SCADA systems. Since these systems run 
continuously and autonomously, personnel may not change 
their usernames and passwords regularly. They may even 
use default usernames and passwords for ease of 
remembering [11]. Brute force methods or logging the user’s 
keystrokes can be used to obtain this information. 
Furthermore, phishing attacks have been conducted widely 
to collect the credentials of ICS operators [12]. If the 
attacker somehow figures out these credentials, he can 
misuse his access and conduct other types of attack. 
Since under this category, we solely consider “accessing” 
the data, in which usually root access is not granted. We 
have classified this attack as low impact. Otherwise, they 
will be categorized in more severe attack types such as 
directory traversal. 
4.b) Man-in-the-Middle 
In the man-in-the-middle attack, the intruder eavesdrops 
on the communication links and tries to compromise the 
messages between two nodes while the nodes think they are 
still talking to each other directly. For instance, the intruder 
may send malicious commands to the actuators pretending to 
be the PLC or send false responses from the sensors to the 
PLC. Further, the intruder may discard or manipulate 
messages. This type of attack will have a valid syntax code; 
hence, rule-based IDS will not be able to identify it from the 
message format [15]. This type of attack can be mostly 
prevented through encryption techniques. 
5) Authorization 
5.a) Directory Traversal 
In this attack, the intruder tries to access the restricted 
directories or files that are supposed to be root access only. 
This vulnerability is due to poor filtering or validation 
mechanisms for user-supplied inputs. Poor directory listing 
control is another cause of these attacks. In this type of 
attack, the intruder will be able to download sensitive files 
and information from the system. 
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This attack often also results in compromising other 
vulnerabilities in SCADA systems such as confidentiality, 
since the attacker might access private files in the system. 
Proper input validation methods can prevent this type of 
attack. 
5.b) Backdoor 
In a backdoor attack, the intruder tries to find a way 
around the authentication process to enter the system. 
Through the backdoor access, the attacker can log into the 
system, reach all the data and files on the system, and 
execute commands. Backdoor installation on the victim 
system may be done by an insider. Once installed, it is very 
difficult to detect this type of attack, and it is considered 
highly dangerous since it grants the intruder full access to 
the system. 
In the case of ICSs, some of the vendors and 
manufacturers have backdoor accounts into their products 
for remote support and updates [16]. This vulnerability puts 
the system in danger, and in case of a successful attack, all 
the SCADA data will be exposed to the intruder. 
B. Risk Assessment 
As discussed in the previous subsection, different 
prevalent attacks have different severity and different rates 
of recurrence. We have built a risk assessment matrix for 
these vulnerabilities, which is shown in Figure 2. In this 
assessment, the impact and the likelihood of occurrence of 
the prevalent attacks are combined for integrated analysis. 
The matrix in this figure has been designed based on our 
study of the prevalent vulnerabilities and the severity of the 
risks associated with them. Vulnerabilities have been 
arranged in the matrix in the order of their likelihood and 
impact severity. It is important to mention that this order in 
the presented risk assessment matrix is based on our 
experience and judgment, and it might slightly differ from 
case to case or for different applications. However, it 
becomes a convenient tool for future studies. 
 
Figure 2. Risk Assessment Matrix of Prevalent Vulnerabilities in IIoT 
Since we have picked the most common attacks, the 
likelihood is classified into three high levels of occurrence: 
occasional, likely, and certain. Similarly, the level of impact 
has been classified as mild, moderate, or critical. The overall 
risk ranking has been color coded. Threats that have severe 
negative impacts and are likely to occur frequently receive 
the highest rank, shown in the red color. Attacks with both 
low impact and low likelihood have the lowest rank, shown 
in the green color. And the yellow colored attacks fall 
between the two other classes. This risk assessment specific 
for the IIoT helps in identifying the threats that have the 
greatest overall risks and must be the top priority to address 
in these systems. 
For instance, code injection is shown in red due to the 
catastrophic results of command manipulation in SCADA 
systems and their high probability of occurrence. DoS 
attacks that often occur would result in the termination of the 
system’s operations. The reconnaissance attacks that harm 
the confidentiality may or may not lead to any negative 
consequences in the system’s function. 
C. ML as a Versatile IIoT Security Tool 
IDS has been widely used as an effective security 
mechanism to counter intrusions. Misuse-based IDSs such as 
rule-based, signature-based, flow-based, and traffic-based 
methods are just some examples of conventional IDSs. Since 
traditionally, most of the connections and traffic in the 
SCADA networks were pre-defined; these types of IDS were 
successful in detecting abnormal activities. For instance, 
when the intruder builds new connections to the victim or 
sends a different type of traffic, there will be unusual data 
flows in the network [17]. 
However, considering frequent upgrades in the networks, 
resulting in regular changes in the topology, the legacy IDSs 
do not perform properly. Also, to counter new types of 
attacks that appear every day, or in scenarios where the 
attack is planned intelligently (e.g., the man-in-the-middle 
attack), smart IDSs are required. 
IDSs are, in general, helpful whenever the intruder affects 
the network data flow. This is true even for ML-based IDSs. 
If the intruder does not interact with any of the network 
elements, it is very difficult even to become aware of the 
intrusion. However, to launch attacks or compromise the 
network activities, the intruder has to disrupt the network 
somehow. The ability of ML algorithms in detecting small 
anomalies distinguishes them from any other type of IDSs. 
ML algorithms can detect anomaly patterns that are 
difficult for humans to discover. To provide a secure 
network, the ML-based IDS can be designed with a moving 
target. This ability of ML models to learn and evolve is 
valuable because the attacks are constantly evolving, and 
new vulnerabilities are discovered every day. This is another 
reason why signature-based IDSs are becoming obsolete, 
and anomaly-based IDSs using ML are the new trend. We 
now discuss the suitability of ML-based IDS for each of the 
security elements. 
1) Integrity 
ML can be very helpful as a detection tool against data 
integrity threats. By training an ML-based IDS with 
legitimate traffic data, the IDS will learn the normal data that 
flow in the system. For instance, in the case of command 
injection, ML will detect the malicious queries that are out 
of the ordinary in the system. This specialized IDS is able to 
recognize the source that is compromising the integrity of 
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the data to block him from the system to maintain the 
trustworthiness of the data. Hence, by learning the common 
behavior of the system, the ML-based IDS can be very 
useful against the attacks targeting this security element. 
2) Availability 
ML can be very useful in detecting the DoS attacks. A 
proper ML algorithm can detect specific characteristics of 
the attacks targeting the availability, for instance, detecting 
the sources with unfamiliar or broadcast addresses, the ones 
that are showing abnormal behaviors, nodes that are sending 
an unreasonable amount of traffic, or when the normal 
operational traffic stops because the HMI or the PLC are 
flooded and unavailable. 
Even though a simple network analyzer can detect the 
DoS attacks, it still requires a human operator to analyze the 
network logs. On the other hand, the ML-based IDS will not 
only provide proper automation but is also not prone to 
human error. Moreover, it has been shown to be effective in 
detecting this kind of out-of-ordinary behaviors. 
3) Confidentiality 
In this type of attack, if the intruder merely eavesdrops on 
the network traffic (i.e., does not send any traffic nor build a 
connection with the devices in the network), it is very hard 
to detect using ML. As mentioned before, when the 
attacker's behavior does not change the network flow, it is 
very hard to detect the attack with any technique, including 
ML. However, as soon as the intruder engages with the 
network, a machine learning powered anomaly-based IDS 
will be able to recognize the abnormal behavior of the 
attacker trying to snoop or asking for unusual information 
from other nodes in the network. However, after engaging 
with the network, the malicious activities go beyond a 
simple eavesdrop attack and are classified under other attack 
categories. 
4) Authentication 
As mentioned before, authentication is a security control 
technique. Attacks targeting this security element need to 
find a way around to bypass this step. To counter these 
threats, it will be more efficient to use prevention techniques 
rather than detection methods. For instance, encryption, 
strong passwords or key management techniques can be 
utilized to prevent unauthenticated access. Even though 
these techniques have their weaknesses, they improve the 
system’s robustness against unauthenticated access. 
5) Authorization 
Activities that do not match with the normal traffic pattern 
even from verified users can be identified using ML 
techniques. Some examples include executing abnormal 
commands, manipulating the sensors and actuators, or 
sending random traffic on the network. If the intruder runs 
zero-day attacks or occasionally accesses the system, he 
might stay undetected for a while, but he will eventually be 
exposed by an ML-based IDS. However, the sensitivity of 
the learning technique must be high. The IDS learns the 
normal conditions of the system and will reveal abusive 
commands, unauthorized users, or intruders. 
The IDS would raise the alarm each time it detects an 
abnormal behavior from a user in the network that must be 
verified by the operator. Raising the sensitivity of the 
utilized ML to detect these attackers will increase the 
number of false positives (normal traffic classified as attack 
traffic). Nevertheless, in security matters, it is better to be 
overcautious keeping the IIoT network safe. A false negative 
(undetected attack) could result in a higher cost than a false 
positive in the critical infrastructures. 
IV. EXISTING MACHINE LEARNING BASED IDSS 
As we discussed in the previous section, since ICSs are 
different from regular IT systems, their communication type 
and even prevalent cyber vulnerabilities differ from a regular 
IT network. Consequently, it is important to consider these 
differences and design specific IDSs for SCADA systems. 
In this section, we review available ML-based IDS 
approaches solving different security vulnerability issues of 
SCADA IIoT systems. Some of the presented research 
works focus on various security aspects. In this case, the first 
time that we mention their work, a detailed description is 
provided; following that in other subsections, just brief 
mentions are made. 
A. Integrity 
Beaver et al. [18] employ six different types of ML 
algorithms, Naive Bayes, random forests (RF), OneR, J48, 
NNge (Non-Nested Generalized Exemplars), SVM (support 
vector machines). Their dataset consists of labeled remote 
terminal unit (RTU) telemetry data from a gas pipeline 
system in Mississippi State University’s Critical 
Infrastructure Protection Center. The attack traffic is 
generated from two types of code injection sets, command 
injection attacks, and data injection attacks. Seven different 
variants of data injection attacks were tried to change the 
pipeline pressure values, and four different variants of 
command injection attacks to manipulate the commands that 
control the gas pipeline. 
Ullah and Mahmoud [19] suggest an IDS using a 
combination of J48 and Naive Bayes techniques. J48 is a 
type of DT (decision tree) technique. They have used the 
same dataset as the previously mentioned research work in 
[18]. The J48 classifier was first used as a supervised 
attribute filter. Then, the Naive Bayes classifier was used to 
develop the anomaly-based intrusion detection. 
Alves et al. [20] employ the k-means technique, which is 
an unsupervised clustering algorithm. An open-source 
virtual PLC (OpenPLC platform) along with AES-256 
encryption is used to simulate a SCADA system. They have 
conducted three different types of attacks against their 
system, code injection, DoS, and interception (eavesdrop). 
He et al. [21] use CDBN (conditional deep belief 
network) to detect attacks in smart grids. They have 
simulated their system using IEEE 118-bus and 300-bus test 
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systems. They also provide a comparison of their method 
with SVM and ANN (artificial neural network). They 
consider false data injection attack that is aimed at the 
integrity of data. 
B. Availability 
Potluri et al. [22] design a hybrid IDS using SVM, and 
DBN (deep belief networks) for industrial networked control 
systems. They have used the NSL-KDD dataset, which is an 
old dataset and is not specific to ICSs but consists of DoS 
and integrity attacks. 
As mentioned in Subsection A, paper [20] studies 
conducting DoS attacks as a part of their dataset to train their 
IDS. 
C. Confidentiality 
Keliris et al. [23] use SVM in their simulated testbed in 
MATLAB controlling Tennessee Eastman (TE) chemical 
process. They have conducted reconnaissance attack as 
vulnerability discovery technique, and further, tried to study 
the effect of command injection attack on the controller to 
manipulate the reactor pressure. 
As mentioned in Subsection A, paper [19] covers 
confidentiality problem through reconnaissance attack. 
Alves et al. [20] (mentioned in Subsection A) also worked 
on eavesdropping attacks. Their unsupervised training 
methods were able to detect these attacks successfully. 
D. Authentication 
The research work [20] was mentioned previously. The 
authors also declare that due to the utilization of encryption, 
their system is resistant to man-in-the-middle attacks. 
Eigner et al. [24] employ KNN (k-nearest neighbors) on a 
custom-built conveyor belt system. They use the normal 
behavior of the system to design an anomaly-based attack 
detection approach. They study the performance of the 
system with different k’s and different distance measurement 
metrics. They have focused on man-in-the-middle attacks as 
the intrusion scenario. 
E. Authorization 
We could not find any work covering this area of 
intrusion detection for SCADA systems using ML 
techniques. Therefore, in this paper, we focus on 
unauthorized intrusion detection in our case study. More 
specifically, we have conducted backdoor attacks on our 
SCADA IIoT testbed. The details are provided in Section V. 
F. No Specific Attack 
Yasakethu and Jiang [25] study the advantages and 
disadvantages of four different types of IDSs, rule-based, 
ANN, HMM (hidden Markov model), SVM, OCSVM (one-
class SVM). However, they do not provide any 
implementation nor any practical analysis of these 
techniques. 
Zhang et al. [26] have used SVM to detect anomalies in 
network traffic. They have generated their dataset using 
simulations of the IEEE 118 bus network. Six features of 
traffic (magnitude and phase of the current, magnitude, and 
phase of voltage, real power, and reactive power) were 
extracted from the data. In that paper, the normal condition 
was defined as when no equipment is disconnected from the 
system, and there is no fault in operation. The fault condition 
is defined as a short circuit occurrence somewhere in the 
system. No cyber-attack was conducted against the system. 
Skripcak and Tanuska [27] have designed a multi-agent 
architecture for SCADA systems to monitor the plant 
processes using passive-aggressive on-line ML algorithms. 
The focus of the paper is to provide the theory behind 
forecasting based on the current situation. 
Siddavatam et al. [17] employ DT and RF techniques. 
Their system prototype has been built in their lab. They have 
extracted several features from the traffic for training such as 
TTL (time to live), byte count for response type, word count 
for query type, packet type, and the reference number for 
query type. To generate abnormal behavior in the system, 
changes in operation were conducted through a control node, 
but no attacks were developed in the system. 
Maglaras et al. [28] use OCSVM as their proposed 
anomaly-based IDS. They declare that OCSVM is a good 
choice because the dataset is imbalanced. The authors have 
used only two features of traffic (data rate and packet size) 
of an electric grid. The trained model did not include any 
malicious attack data, and the trained dataset was captured 
during normal operation of a SCADA system. 
Mantere et al. [29] have focused just on feature selections 
in designing an anomaly-based detection. They have chosen 
features such as flow directions, individual packet sizes, 
protocol, average packet rates, average data byte rates as the 
most determining features. The traffic was captured from 
two different locations within an industrial site. However, no 
attack data were considered in this paper. 
G. Summary 
Table I provides a summary of this section. In this table, 
the available ML-based anomaly detection approaches in 
SCADA are classified based on the type of their targeted 
vulnerabilities. This table provides a concise overview of 
where the most focus of the research works available in the 
literature is. 
As shown in this table, we could not find any ML-based 
research work in authorization aspects of SCADA security. 
Hence, we have focused on this area in the next section. 
Table I. Available ML-Based IDS for ICS Vulnerabilities 
 
SVM or 
OCSVM 
NB DT or RF DBN ANN 
KNN or 
K-means 
Integrity 
[18] [21] 
[22] [23] 
[19] 
[18] 
[19] [18] [21] [22] [21] [20] 
Availability [22]   [22]  [20] 
Confidentiality [23] [19] [19]   [20] 
Authentication      [20] [24] 
Authorization       
No Specific 
Attack 
[25] [26] 
[28] 
 [17]  [25]  
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V. OUR CASE STUDY 
In this section, we describe our testbed and the evaluation 
results of our proposed ML-based IDS. The problem of 
intrusion detection in the IIoT systems is explored. To detect 
manipulated commands, system’s transactions were logged 
and used to train the ML algorithms. We start this section by 
introducing our prior work and how this work is different, 
then the details on the testbed implementation, conducted 
cyber-attacks, and then the designed IDSs and their 
performance evaluations. 
A. Our Prior Work 
In [30], we have presented the effect of imbalanced 
datasets. Even though ML has proven its capability in 
intrusion detection, there are cases that it falls short. 
Severely imbalanced training datasets where the number of 
attack data is significantly lower than normal data (e.g., less 
than 1%) is a real-world challenge that is quite common in 
IIoT security. 
In [31] and [32], we have investigated IDS design using 
ML and ANN models for securing the confidentiality and 
availability (reconnaissance and DoS attacks) of the system. 
However, in this work, we have improved our testbed by 
adding the following elements: 
• Turbidity alarm and turbidity sensor have been 
embedded in the testbed to add analog input to the system. 
This helps us investigate overwriting analog registers 
(turbidity level of the water) in the PLC. 
• Backdoor, command injection and SQL injection 
attacks are used to study the authentication and data integrity 
aspects of the security for these systems. 
• New metrics have been used to evaluate the 
performance of the trained model. These metrics represent 
the quality of the performance with better granularity. 
• Feature importance ranking study has been conducted 
to show which features are the most salient ones in 
distinguishing the attack traffic from the normal. 
B. Our SCADA IDS Testbed Implementation 
Industrial companies almost never release their network 
data, because they are obligated to follow confidentiality 
laws and user privacy restrictions. Hence, real-world IIoT 
datasets are not available for security research in this area. In 
the IIoT security domain, the researchers usually have to use 
commercial or public datasets that are not specific to this 
domain. In our work, we developed a real-world testbed that 
resembles an actual industrial plant. We have conducted real 
cyber-attacks against the system to gather realistic datasets 
containing both normal and attack traffic analogous to real 
industrial network traffic. 
We have picked an IIoT system that supervises the water 
level and turbidity quantity of the water storage tank, shown 
in Figure 3. This system is a part of the water treatment and 
distribution process in industrial reservoirs. This testbed 
includes components like historical logs, HMI, PLC. There 
are three sensors and four actuators in this testbed. Two 
water level sensors and an analog turbidity sensor compose 
the inputs. A three-light turbidity alarm, a valve, and two 
water are the actuators that receive the commands from the 
PLC. Also, there are control buttons (On, Off, Light 
Indicator) for manual control of the system. A detailed 
explanation of the testbed and its elements can be found in 
our previous work [30]. 
In short, the task of this testbed is to keep the water level 
between two pre-defined levels. At the same time, it 
measures the turbidity level of the water and illuminates one 
of the red, yellow or green lights of the turbidity alarm, 
based on the cloudiness level of the water. Modbus was 
utilized as the communication protocol in our testbed since it 
is one of the most popular IIoT protocols commonly used in 
the industrial control systems. The logic of the PLC is 
programmed using the Ladder language [33], [34]. 
 
Figure 3. Scheme of Our Implemented Testbed 
C. Our Attack Scenarios 
Since, to the best of our knowledge, no research paper has 
focused on machine learning-based IDS in SCADA systems 
for backdoor attacks, we conducted these attacks along with 
two other types of cyber-attacks. We have generated SQL 
injection and command injection attacks to have a larger 
variety of attack records in our dataset. These attacks were 
carried out using the Kali Linux Penetration Testing 
Distribution [35]. All the data generated during the attack 
phase as well as the normal traffic was gathered and 
recorded by Argus [36] and Wireshark [37] network tools. 
An important point that should be mentioned here is that 
we have deliberately built our dataset to be imbalanced. The 
percentage of attack traffic in the dataset is less than 0.2%. 
This assumption makes the system as similar as possible to 
the real-world industrial control systems. The statistics of the 
dataset are shown in Table II, where the average data rate 
was 419 kbit/s, and the average packet size was measured as 
76.75 bytes. 
Table II. Our Built Dataset Statistical Information 
Type of the Traffic Percentage 
Normal Traffic 99.81 
Total Attack Traffic 0.19 
Backdoor Traffic 0.085 
SQL Injection Traffic 0.065 
Command Injection Traffic 0.04 
 
PLC
History Logs HMI
PLC
Valve
Pump 1
Pump 2
Turbidity 
Alarm
Sensor 1
Sensor 2
Turbidity 
Sensor
Modbus 
TCP
Ethernet
On Button
Off Button
Light Indicator
Water Tank
IDS
Internet
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A brief explanation of how these three attacks disrupt the 
normal operation is provided next. 
1) Backdoor 
In this attack, our target is the HMI system, which gets 
infected with a backdoor virus. This virus works in the 
background and is hidden from the SCADA system’s 
operator. The backdoor virus opens a port in HMI allowing a 
remote connection to be established with the attacker’s PC. 
Thus, the attacker gains full access to the HMI computer, 
where the SCADA system is installed. Using the backdoor, 
the attacker can explore the HMI system and download any 
file, including the dataset with all the sensor and actuator 
values. In this attack scenario, we (as the white hat attacker) 
transferred about 1GB of files containing sensitive 
information from the HMI to the attacker’s PC. We ran this 
attack several times to get the status of the system in 
different situations. Further, using this attack, we built new 
directories in the SCADA system and removed several files 
to disrupt the HMI operation. 
2) Command Injection 
In this attack, the target is the PLC. First, the attacker’s 
PC connects to the network and is able to read all the PLC 
register values and logs them into a .txt file. After gaining 
access to the PLC register information, the attacker rewrites 
some of the PLC registers that are vital to the physical 
process. For example, while Pump 2 was supposed to draw 
water from the tank, we (as the white hat attacker) stopped 
it, started Pump 1, and the water flowed out from the tank. 
Another instance is when we turned on the wrong turbidity 
alarm light, in the way that, while the turbidity level was 
high, and the red light was supposed to be on, we (as the 
attacker) turned off the red light and turned on the green 
light instead. 
3) SQL Injection 
In this attack, both the HMI system and the PLC device 
are targeted. They both have web servers for setting up and 
accessing their configuration and information. In this attack, 
the attacker’s PC sends database queries to submit untrusted 
data. We (as the white hat attacker) sent malicious SQL 
commands which were executed on the database. We ran 
this attack many times and logged all the network traffic. 
D. Feature Selection 
An important step in training the ML models is selecting 
and extracting features from the traffic. Here, in designing 
our IDS, we chose the features that their values change 
during the attack phases compared to the normal operation 
phases. If a selected feature does not vary during the attacks, 
then even the best algorithm will not be able to detect an 
intrusion or an anomalous situation using that feature. 
In our study, we reviewed the potential features and chose 
23 features that are common in network flows and also 
change during the attack phases. Table III shows the chosen 
features along with their description. 
Table III. Selected Traffic Features in Our Proposed IDS 
Features Type Descriptions 
Mean flow (mean) Float 
The average duration of the active 
flows 
Source Port (Sport) Integer Source port number 
Destination Port (Dport) Integer Destination port number 
Source Packets (Spkts) Integer Source/Destination packet count 
Destination Packets 
(Dpkts) 
Integer Destination/Source packet count 
Total Packets (Tpkts) Integer Total transaction packet count 
Source Bytes (Sbytes) Integer Source/Destination bytes count 
Destination Bytes (Dbytes) Integer Destination/Source bytes count 
Total Bytes (TBytes) Integer Total transaction bytes count 
Source Load (Sload) Float Source bits per second 
Destination Load (Dload) Float Destination bits per second 
Total Load (Tload) Float Total bits per second 
Source Rate (Srate) Float Source packets per second 
Destination Rate (Drate) Float Destination packets per second 
Total Rate (Trate) Float Total packets per second 
Source Loss (Sloss) Float 
Source packets 
retransmitted/dropped 
Destination Loss (Dloss) Float 
Destination packets 
retransmitted/dropped 
Total Loss (Tloss) Float Total packets retransmitted/dropped 
Total Percent Loss (Ploss) Float 
Percent packets 
retransmitted/dropped 
Source Jitter (ScrJitter) Float Source jitter in millisecond 
Destination Jitter 
(DrcJitter) 
Float Destination jitter in millisecond 
Source Interpacket 
(SIntPkt) 
Float 
Source interpacket arrival time in 
millisecond 
Destination Interpacket 
(DIntPkt) 
Float 
Destination interpacket arrival time 
in millisecond 
 
How each feature varies depends on the type of attack. 
For instance, during the normal condition, where there is no 
attack, the SrcPkts and DstPkts features mostly show a 
periodic behavior. On the other hand, during attacks, these 
features show random behavior. 
Further, we have studied the importance of the features. 
They are ranked based on how salient they are in helping the 
algorithm distinguish the normal traffic from the attack 
traffic. In this technique, the values of each feature are 
permuted randomly one at a time, creating new datasets. The 
ML model is trained on these datasets, and the increase in 
classification error is measured for each. If the increase is 
high, then the feature is important, and conversely, if it is 
low, the feature is considered as not important. For each 
feature, the “model reliance” or importance coefficient is 
defined as the ratio of the model’s error value after 
permutation to the standard error value when none of the 
variables are permuted. For more detailed information, we 
refer readers to [38] and [39]. 
As we report later in this Section, random forest (RF) has 
shown the best classification performance, so we have 
picked this algorithm to calculate the importance. In Figure 
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4, the top five important features in our dataset along with 
their normalized (so the total of 23 feature importance values 
sum to 1) importance coefficient are shown. While these are 
the top five features, the threshold for the importance has 
shown that all the 23 features are required for training. 
 
Figure 4. Top Five Important Features 
E. Machine Learning Techniques 
In this case study, the ML-based IDS is designed just as a 
binary classification to decide whether a particular traffic 
sample is an attack or normal. The inputs to the IDS are the 
23 chosen features, as mentioned in the previous section, and 
the output of the IDS is either 0 (normal traffic) or 1 (attack 
traffic). Also, for a total of 451,372 traffic samples, we use 
the ratio of 80% to 20% to divide the dataset into training 
and testing sets, respectively. 
We have used and tested seven different techniques for 
the IDS; SVM, KNN, Naive Bayes (NB), RF, Decision Tree 
(DT), Logistic Regression (LR), and Artificial Neural 
Network (ANN). We have used the Keras library [40] to 
build the ANN, and for the other algorithms, the scikit-learn 
library [41] was utilized to develop the learning models for 
the IDS. The models are trained and tested over the data 
collected in the testbed, and the results of their performance 
are compared. 
F. Performance Metrics 
Table IV. Confusion Matrix in IDS Context 
 
Predicted Class 
Classified as Normal Classified as Attack 
Actual Class 
Normal Data True Negative (TN) False Positive (FP) 
Attack Data False Negative (FN) True Positive (TP) 
 
Traditionally, the performance of the ML algorithms is 
measured by metrics which are derived from the confusion 
matrix. Table IV shows the confusion matrix. The 
description of the matrix confusion parameters is as follows: 
• True Negatives (TN): Represents the number of normal 
packets correctly classified as normal. 
• True Positives (TP): Represents the number of 
abnormal packets (attacks) correctly classified as attacks. 
• False Positive (FP): Represent the number of normal 
packets incorrectly classified as attacks. 
• False Negative (FN): Represents the number of 
abnormal packets (attacks) incorrectly classified as normal 
packets. As an example, we picked the RF model to show its 
classification results in the form of confusion matrix in 
Table V. 
Table V. Confusion Matrix of RF Classification Results 
 
Predicted Class 
Classified as Normal Classified as Attack 
Actual Class 
Normal Data 450561 30 
Attack Data 20 761 
 
Based on the confusion matrix, the metrics used in this 
work to evaluate the performance of the ML algorithms are 
as follows: 
• Accuracy: Shows the percentage of the correctly 
predicted samples considering the total number of 
predictions. 
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 =  
𝑇𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁
𝑇𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁
 ×  100 (1) 
• False Alarm Rate (FAR): Represents the percentage of 
the regular traffic misclassified as attacks. 
𝐹𝐴𝑅 =  
𝐹𝑃
𝐹𝑃 +  𝑇𝑁
 ×  100 (2) 
• Undetected Rate (UR): The fraction of the anomaly 
traffic (attack) misclassified as normal. 
𝑈𝑅 =  
𝐹𝑁
𝐹𝑁 + 𝑇𝑃
 ×  100 (3) 
• Matthews Correlation Coefficient (MCC): Measures 
the quality of the classification. MCC shows the correlation 
agreement between the observed values and the predicted 
values. 
𝑀𝐶𝐶
=  
𝑇𝑃 × 𝑇𝑁 − 𝐹𝑃 × 𝐹𝑁
√(𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑃) × (𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁) × (𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑃) × (𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑁)
2
 
×  100 
(4) 
• Sensitivity: Also known as the true positive rate. A 
sensitive algorithm helps rule out an attack situation with 
more confidence when the predicted data is labeled as 
“normal.” While Sensitivity and the UR are complementary, 
each shows a different aspect of performance interpretation. 
If the focus is on minimizing FN, we would want to increase 
the Sensitivity of the model as much as possible (close to 
100%), so that a smaller number of attacks stay undetected. 
Meanwhile, UR represents the fraction of these FN samples. 
𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 =  
𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁
 ×  100 (5) 
Accuracy (Eq. 1) is the most frequently used metric for 
assessing the performance of binary classifiers. However, 
this metric is not sufficient for evaluation in scenarios with 
imbalanced classes (i.e., one class is dominant and has more 
training data compared to the other). In our case, which is an 
IDS scenario, the proportion of normal traffic to attack 
traffic is very high resembling a realistic dataset. This case is 
also valid where detecting rare anomalies is crucial like 
fraudulent bank transactions and identification of rare 
diseases. Therefore, in addition to the accuracy, we use other 
metrics evaluating the performance in a more meaningful 
way. 
G. Results 
In this section, we present the numerical results of our 
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algorithms detecting the attacks described in Subsection 
V.C. Figure 5 shows the accuracy results (Eq. 1). While RF 
shows the best performance and NB the worst, accuracy is 
not the best metric to evaluate the performance. As it was 
mentioned before, in scenarios like intrusion detection, the 
algorithms are biased toward estimating all the samples as 
normal. Even if an algorithm detects all the samples (even 
the attack ones) as normal, the accuracy will still be high, 
since the attack samples consist of a very small part of the 
dataset. 
 
Figure 5. Accuracy 
The false alarm rate (FAR), shown in Figure 6, represents 
the percentage of the normal traffic being misclassified as 
the attack traffic by the model (Eq. 2). Figure 6 shows good 
performance for all the models except NB. However, even 
this metric alone cannot truly represent the performance. 
Since the number of normal traffic is considerably higher 
than the attack data, and also the models are biased to label 
almost all the test data as normal (due to the imbalanced 
training dataset), the FAR value is expected to be low. 
 
Figure 6. False Alarm Rate 
Undetected rate (UR) metric can assess the performance 
better in spite of the imbalanced data. As shown in Figure 7, 
UR represents the percentage of the attack traffic that is 
misclassified as normal (the opposite of the FAR) (Eq. 3). 
Since this metric considers only the attack traffic, the fact of 
having an imbalanced dataset does not impact the 
evaluation. LR has the worst performance, even compared to 
a detector that would randomly assign true and false to each 
traffic packet, which would lead to 50% UR with an infinite 
number of packets. However, RF showed the best 
performance. This metric is more critical than FAR because 
it is related to the attacks not being detected by the system. 
 
Figure 7. Undetected Rate 
Figure 8 shows the ROC (receiver operating 
characteristic) curve. This curve basically plots the TP rate 
versus the FP rate for each model. As depicted, while RF 
shows the best performance, LR has the worst performance. 
The poor performance of LR for this metric is due to the low 
TP rate of the model in detecting abnormal traffic. 
 
Figure 8. ROC Curve 
MCC (Eq. 4), shown in Figure 9, is considered to be one 
of the best metrics for classification evaluation, and it is 
generally a better performance representative compared to 
the ROC curve and other metrics. As shown in this figure, 
RF has the best MCC value, while NB has the worst. MCC 
is considered as a fair metric when it comes to evaluating 
ML models that were trained with an imbalanced dataset. 
Since this metric represents the correlation agreement 
between the observed values and the predicted values, it is 
less affected by severe imbalanced ratios. 
 
Figure 9. MCC 
Finally, the sensitivity metric results (Eq. 5) are shown in 
Figure 10 to evaluate how sensitive each model is in reacting 
to an abnormal situation. As seen in the figure, RF and NB 
have the highest sensitivity, while LR shows the lowest. 
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Figure 10. Sensitivity 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
The cyber-security of the IIoT devices is critical. There is 
still a huge gap in providing adequate security for these 
systems, which is why it is crucial to focus on the industrial 
aspect of IoT technology. Machine learning solutions and 
big data analytics have been widely used to ensure a secure 
platform in the IT systems. However, due to the fundamental 
differences and dissimilar priorities of ICS and the 
traditional IT systems, their prevalent cyber-risks are 
different. Thus, special attention is required to provide 
security for IIoT. Through our discussions and experimental 
evaluation, we have demonstrated the effectiveness of 
machine learning for the security of these systems. 
In this paper, we first studied the four most common 
protocols used in SCADA IIoT along with their security 
susceptibilities. Afterward, we carried out a risk assessment 
of the most important and prevalent vulnerabilities of the 
SCADA IIoT systems, and how ML-based solutions would 
be useful to combat them. Following that, a literature review 
on the existing anomaly detection approaches for SCADA 
systems using machine learning was provided to show where 
there is still a need for providing security. In the last section, 
we presented our case study and presented how machine 
learning is capable of filling the identified gap by handling 
new types of attacks such as backdoor, command injection 
and SQL injection. Feature importance ranking was also 
studied to highlight the most salient features in 
distinguishing the attack traffic from the normal traffic. The 
testbed built for this research work was designed to be as 
similar as possible to real-world IIoT scenarios. Special 
attention was also paid to evaluate the performance of the 
system using better representative metrics. 
As our future direction, we plan to focus on utilizing a 
joint design of multiple algorithms to achieve better 
performance. The hybrid model should be able to provide 
more accurate results compared to any of the constituent 
models. False negatives, even a low number of them, mean 
malicious exertions against the system that stayed 
undetected and could lead to catastrophic results. Hence, 
reducing the number of false negatives is what we plan to 
concentrate on. 
VII. ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
This publication was made possible by NPRP grant 
#NPRP 10-901-2-370 from the Qatar National Research 
Fund (a member of Qatar Foundation). The statements made 
herein are solely the responsibility of the authors. 
 Dr. Marcio A. Teixeira was supported by grant# 
2017/01055-4 from São Paulo Research Foundation 
(FAPESP). FAPESP. He would also like to thank his 
primary institution - Instituto Federal de Educação, Ciência e 
Tecnologia de São Paulo (IFSP). 
REFERENCES 
 
[1]  J. Jayasamraj, "SCADA Communication & Protocols," Power 
System Operation Corporation Ltd., February 2013.  
[2]  G. R. Clarke, D. Reynders and E. Wright, Practical modern 
SCADA protocols: DNP3, 60870.5 and related systems, 
Newnes, Elsevier, ISBN 0-7506-5799-5, 2004.  
[3]  "MQTT," [Online]. Available: http://mqtt.org. [Accessed 
March 2019]. 
[4]  A. Antonini, A. Barenghi, G. Pelosi and S. Zonouz, "Security 
challenges in building automation and SCADA," 2014 
International Carnahan Conference on Security Technology 
(ICCST), no. Rome, pp. 1-6, 2014.  
[5]  D. G. Holmberg, "BACnet Wide Area Network Security 
Threat Assessment," National Institute of Standard and 
Technology, 2003.  
[6]  Y. Xu, Y. Yang, T. Li, J. Ju and Q. Wang, "Review on cyber 
vulnerabilities of communication protocols in industrial 
control systems," 2017 IEEE Conference on Energy Internet 
and Energy System Integration (EI2), no. Beijing, pp. 1-6, 
2017.  
[7]  "IEEE Standards Association," [Online]. Available: 
https://standards.ieee.org/standard/1815-2012.html. [Accessed 
March 2019]. 
[8]  "HiveMQ," [Online]. Available: 
https://www.hivemq.com/tags/mqtt-security-fundamentals/. 
[Accessed March 2019]. 
[9]  K. Stouffer, V. Pillitteri, S. Lightman, M. Abrams and A. 
Hahn, "Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security," 
National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2015. 
[10]  B. Zhu, A. Joseph and S. Sastry, "A Taxonomy of Cyber 
Attacks on SCADA Systems," 2011 International Conference 
on Internet of Things and 4th International Conference on 
Cyber, Physical and Social Computing, no. Dalian, pp. 380-
388, 2011.  
[11]  S. Samtani, S. Yu, H. Zhu, M. Patton and H. Chen, 
"Identifying SCADA Vulnerabilities Using Passive and Active 
Vulnerability Assessment Techniques," 2016 IEEE 
Conference on Intelligence and Security Informatics (ISI), no. 
Tucson, AZ, pp. 25-30, 2016.  
[12]  G. Falco, C. Caldera and H. Shrobe, "IIoT Cybersecurity Risk 
Modeling for SCADA Systems," IEEE Internet of Things 
Journal, pp. 4486-4495, 2018.  
[13]  S. Dunhaupt, "Vulnerabilities of Industrial Automation 
Systems," RUHR Universitat, 2012. 
[14]  T. Morris and W. Gao, "Industrial Control System Traffic 
Data Sets for Intrusion Detection Research," in International 
Conference on Critical Infrastructure Protection, Berlin, 
Heidelberg, 2014.  
[15]  J. Verba and M. Milvich, "Idaho National Laboratory 
97.44 97.44 94.87
91.03
87.18
65.38
47.44
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Random Forest Naive Bayes Decision Tree KNN ANN SVM Logistic
Regression
Se
n
si
ti
vi
ty
 (
%
)
  13 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition Intrusion Detection 
System (SCADA IDS)," 2008 IEEE Conference on 
Technologies for Homeland Security, no. Waltham, MA, pp. 
469-473, 2008.  
[16]  T. Bartman and K. Carson, "Securing Communications for 
SCADA and Critical Industrial Systems," 2016 69th Annual 
Conference for Protective Relay Engineers (CPRE), no. 
College Station, TX, pp. 1-10, 2016.  
[17]  I. A. Siddavatam, S. Satish, W. Mahesh and F. Kazi, "An 
Ensemble Learning for Anomaly Identification in SCADA 
System," 2017 7th International Conference on Power 
Systems (ICPS), no. Pune, pp. 457-462, 2017.  
[18]  J. M. Beaver, R. C. Borges-Hink and M. A. Buckner, "An 
Evaluation of Machine Learning Methods to Detect Malicious 
SCADA Communications," 2013 12th International 
Conference on Machine Learning and Applications, no. 
Miami, FL, pp. 54-59, 2013.  
[19]  I. Ullah and Q. H. Mahmoud, "A Hybrid Model for Anomaly-
based Intrusion Detection in SCADA Networks," 2017 IEEE 
International Conference on Big Data (Big Data), no. Boston, 
MA, pp. 2160-2167, 2017.  
[20]  T. Alves, R. Das and T. Morris, "Embedding Encryption and 
Machine Learning Intrusion Prevention Systems on 
Programmable Logic Controllers," in IEEE Embedded 
Systems Letters, pp. 1-6, 2018.  
[21]  Y. He, G. J. Mendis and J. Wei, "Real-Time Detection of 
False Data Injection Attacks in Smart Grid: A Deep Learning-
Based Intelligent Mechanism," in IEEE Transactions on Smart 
Grid, pp. 2505-2516, 2017.  
[22]  S. Potluri, N. F. Henry and C. Diedrich, "Evaluation of Hybrid 
Deep Learning Techniques for Ensuring Security in 
Networked Control Systems," 2017 22nd IEEE International 
Conference on Emerging Technologies and Factory 
Automation (ETFA), no. Limassol, pp. 1-8, 2017.  
[23]  A. Keliris, H. Salehghaffari, B. Cairl, P. Krishnamurthy, M. 
Maniatakos and F. Khorrami, "Machine learning-based 
defense against process-aware attacks on Industrial Control 
Systems," 2016 IEEE International Test Conference (ITC), no. 
Fort Worth, TX, pp. 1-10, 2016.  
[24]  O. Eigner, P. Kreimel and P. Tavolato, "Detection of Man-in-
the-Middle Attacks on Industrial Control Networks," 2016 
International Conference on Software Security and Assurance 
(ICSSA), no. St. Polten, pp. 64-69, 2016.  
[25]  S. Yasakethu and J. Jiang, "Intrusion Detection via Machine 
Learning for SCADA System Protection," ICS-CSR 2013 
Proceedings of the 1st International Symposium on ICS & 
SCADA Cyber Security Research, pp. 101-105, 2013.  
[26]  Y. Zhang, M. D. Ilic and O. K. Tonguz, "Mitigating Blackouts 
via Smart Relays: A Machine Learning Approach," in 
Proceedings of the IEEE, vol. 99, pp. 94-118, January 2011.  
[27]  T. Skripcak and P. Tanuska, "Utilisation of on-line machine 
learning for SCADA system alarms forecasting," 2013 Science 
and Information Conference, no. London, pp. 477-484, 2013.  
[28]  L. A. Maglaras and J. Jiang, "Intrusion detection in SCADA 
systems using machine learning techniques," 2014 Science 
and Information Conference, no. London, pp. 626-631, 2014.  
[29]  M. Mantere, M. Sailio and S. Noponen, "Feature Selection for 
Machine Learning Based Anomaly Detection in Industrial 
Control System Networks," 2012 IEEE International 
Conference on Green Computing and Communications, no. 
Besancon, pp. 771-774, 2012.  
[30]  M. Zolanvari, M. A. Teixeira and R. Jain, "Effect of 
Imbalanced Datasets on Security of Industrial IoT Using 
Machine Learning," in IEEE Intelligence and Security 
Informatics (ISI), Miami, 2018.  
[31]  M. A. Teixeira, M. Zolanvari, T. Salman and R. Jain, "An 
Intrusion Detection System Based on Deep Learning 
Algorithm for Industrial Control Systems," Submitted to 
EURASIP Journal on Information Security, June 2018.  
[32]  M. A. Teixeira, T. Salman, M. Zolanvari, M. Samaka, R. Jain 
and N. Meskin, "SCADA System Testbed for Cybersecurity 
Research Using Machine Learning Approach," in Future 
Internet, July 2018.  
[33]  Schneider PLC, M241CE40, [Online]. Available: 
http://www.filkab.com/files/category_files/file_3073_Bg.pdf. 
[Accessed March 2019]. 
[34]  K. T. Erickson, Programmable Logic Controllers: An 
Emphasis on Design and Application, Dogwood Valley Press, 
LLC, 2011.  
[35]  "Kali Linux," [Online]. Available: https://www.kali.org. 
[Accessed March 2019]. 
[36]  Argus, [Online]. Available: https://qosient.com/argus/. 
[Accessed March 2019]. 
[37]  Wireshark, [Online]. Available: https://www.wireshark.org/. 
[Accessed March 2019]. 
[38]  A. Fisher, C. Rudin and F. Dominici, "Model Class Reliance: 
Variable importance measures for any machine learning model 
class, from the ‘Rashomon’ perspective.," arXiv:1801.01489, 
2018.  
[39]  C. Molnar, "Interpretable machine learning. A Guide for 
Making Black Box Models Explainable," 2018. [Online]. 
Available: https://christophm.github.io/interpretable-ml-book/. 
[Accessed April 2019]. 
[40]  Keras. [Online]. Available: https://keras.io. [Accessed March 
2019]. 
[41]  scikit-learn. [Online]. Available: https://scikit-
learn.org/stable/. [Accessed March 2019]. 
 
 
Maede Zolanvari is an IEEE student 
member. She received her B.S. and 
M.S. degree in Electrical and Computer 
Engineering, in 2012 and 2015 
respectively. She’s currently a Ph.D. 
candidate in Computer Science and 
Engineering at Washington University, 
St. Louis, MO, USA. During 2012 
through 2015, her research was on 
performance improvement of communication networks. 
Since 2015, she has been working as a graduate research 
assistant at Washington University. Her current research 
focus is on utilizing machine learning and deep learning for 
network security of the Industrial Internet of Things. Her 
research interests include the Internet of Things, machine 
learning, cyber-security, secure computer networks, and 
wireless communications. 
 
  14 
Marcio A. Teixeira is an IEEE senior 
member. He received his Ph.D. in 
Electrical Engineering at the Federal 
University of Uberlândia, Brazil in 
2012, and received his MSc degree in 
Computer Science at the same 
university in 2004. 
Currently, Dr. Marcio is a professor at 
the Federal Institute of Education, 
Science and Technology of São Paulo, Brazil. From 2017 to 
2018, he worked as a postdoctoral researcher in 
Cybersecurity in the Department of Computer Science and 
Engineering at Washington University in St. Louis, MO, 
USA. His present research interest includes cybersecurity, 
network security, machine learning, deep learning, network 
performance analysis, wireless network protocols, and next-
generation wireless communications. 
 
Lav Gupta is a senior member of 
IEEE. He received BS and MS degrees 
from the Indian Institute of Technology 
(IIT) in 1978 and 1980, respectively. 
He is currently a doctoral candidate in 
Computer Science and Engineering at 
Washington University in St. Louis, 
Missouri, USA. He has worked for 
about fifteen years in network 
planning, deployment, and regulation. He has also worked as 
a senior faculty of Computer Science and Access Network 
Planning in India and the UAE for a total of about fifteen 
years. He is the author of one book, twelve first author 
papers and has been a speaker at many international 
seminars. His current research areas are virtual network 
services, multi-cloud systems, fault and performance 
management in cloud-based, Cybersecurity and applied 
machine/deep learning. He is a recipient of best software 
award from Computer Society of India and best faculty 
award at Etisalat Academy, UAE. 
 
Khaled M. Khan is an associate 
professor in the department of 
Computer Science and Engineering and 
associated with the KINDI Centre for 
Computing Research at Qatar 
University. Prior to these, he served 
Western Sydney University (Australia) 
as a senior lecturer and was the Head of 
graduate programs. He received his 
Ph.D. in computing from Monash University, and BS and 
MS degrees both in computer science from the Norwegian 
University of Science and Technology. He is the Editor-in-
Chief Emeritus of the International Journal of Secure 
Software Engineering. 
 
Raj Jain is a Fellow of IEEE, a Fellow 
of ACM, and a Fellow of AAAS. He 
received BS degree in Electrical 
Engineering from APS University in 
Rewa, India in 1972 and MS in 
Automation from IISc, Bangalore, India 
in 1974 and the Ph.D. degree in 
Applied Math/Computer Science from 
Harvard University in 1978. He is 
currently the Barbara J. and Jerome R. Cox, Jr., Professor of 
Computer Science and Engineering at Washington 
University in St. Louis. Previously, he was one of the Co-
founders of Nayna Networks, Inc - a next generation 
telecommunications systems company in San Jose, CA. He 
was a Senior Consulting Engineer at Digital Equipment 
Corporation in Littleton, Mass and then a professor of 
Computer and Information Sciences at Ohio State University 
in Columbus, Ohio. Dr. Jain is the winner of the 2017 ACM 
SIGCOMM Life-Time Achievement Award. With 30,000+ 
citations on Google Scholar, he ranks among the Most Cited 
Authors in Computer Science. 
